

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Equitable PERSTEMPO – The Challenge for Long-term Deployed Armed Forces

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ABSTRACT

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Peace keeping operations are often long-term operations. Some units and also specific soldiers with high-demand, low density military occupational skills have to be deployed again and again. The frequency and the duration deployment describe the PERSTEMPO. The challenge for the military leadership is to develop solutions for an equitable and acceptable PERSTEMPO. This project will analyze and assess current PERSTEMPO, and will make recommendations for a just PERSTEMPO. The research uses a model developed in the German Army.

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EQUITABLE PERSTEMPO – THE CHALLENGE FOR LONG-TERM DEPLOYED ARMED FORCES

Well-trained, highly capable and motivated personnel, both military and civilian, are the Bundeswehr's greatest asset. ... the quality and job satisfaction of its personnel will have a substantial impact on the operational effectiveness of the Bundeswehr of the future.

—Rudolf Scharping
Former Federal Minister of Defense

The vision begins talking about people, and it ends talking about people. And what it should suggest to you is that people are the engine behind all of our magnificent moments as an Army.

—General Erik Shinseki
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

1. INTRODUCTION

In the early nineties of the 20th century, after the end of the Cold War, many countries cut back on the number of their troops. At the same time, however, the number of tasks the armed forces were expected to perform increased, in particular as a result of their participation in peace operations worldwide. Crises which had been suppressed at the time of the Cold War were now breaking out.¹ While some crises were defused through the peaceful cooperation among the parties concerned², others resulted in civil war.³ In several instances, the United Nations was called upon for help in settling conflicts which sometimes required the employment of armed forces.

Some countries such as Germany were now using their armed forces in peace operations for the first time.⁴ Other states, for instance the US, Britain and France, which - because of their history - had already assumed responsibility throughout the world kept up their involvement in peace operations.

The analysis presented here attempts to show the problems soldiers are having to cope with as a result of an extended involvement, using the example of the German Army.⁵

2. GERMANY'S INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

2.1 PEACE OPERATIONS IN WHICH GERMAN FORCES PARTICIPATED

The 1993/1994 mission in Somalia (United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)) heralded the beginning of Germany's involvement in peace operations. The spectrum of tasks

Bundeswehr soldiers had to carry out was confined to logistic and transport support for the coalition forces, and security tasks for Bundeswehr forces.

In 1995, Germany participated in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia, where Bundeswehr soldiers set up a hospital and performed security functions.

Following the Srebrenica massacre (in the summer of 1995) and the Dayton Peace Agreement (November 1995), which aimed at settling the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself to detaching armed forces to the Implementation Force (IFOR).⁶ The principal tasks of Germany's contingent comprised running a hospital in the Croatian town of Split, providing logistic and transport support for the allied forces serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and conducting reconstruction measures in Croatia.⁷ During their mission with IFOR, the German armed forces involved were not yet stationed in the actual theater – Bosnia-Herzegovina – but carried out their tasks from locations on Croatia's Adriatic coast. From the outset, the duration of the IFOR mission had been limited to twelve months.

IFOR's successor, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), included German forces from the start.⁸ The Bundeswehr no longer had to confine itself to supporting functions but was employed in the same spectrum of tasks as US, British, French and other coalition forces. The nucleus of the German contingent comprised a reinforced maneuver battalion, which conducted operations as part of the "Deutsch Franzoesische Gruppe - Groupement Franco-Allemand" (DFGFA) under the command of a German general.⁹ When the SFOR mission, the duration of which had initially been limited to 18 months, was extended to an indefinite period, the German contingent continued to be an integral part of the SFOR forces.¹⁰

In the summer of 1998 tensions in Kosovo mounted, and the Yugoslav government was persuaded by international organizations to have the situation seen to by OSCE observers. The Federal Republic of Germany was now involved in three respects:¹¹

- Dispatching observers as part of the OSCE mission¹²
- Monitoring Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
- Detaching armed forces to the Extraction Force¹³.

Following an aggravation of the situation in Kosovo, the Bundeswehr joined the NATO Air Campaign ALLIED FORCE against the Republic of Yugoslavia in spring of 1999. At the same time, a reinforced brigade was deployed to and kept on standby in Macedonia, so as to be employed from there for the liberation of the Kosovo in the scope of the following NATO Ground

Campaign. In addition, several thousand soldiers were employed to set up refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia in spring of 1999.¹⁴ Since June of 1999, the Bundeswehr has permanently provided a major contingent in the scope of KFOR.

Since spring of 2001, the Bundeswehr has been involved in Task Force Fox (TFF) to quieten down the situation in neighboring Macedonia.¹⁵

Since Al-Quaida's terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, the Bundeswehr has participated in operation ENDURING FREEDOM (EF), meant to fight international terrorism, and in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a protection force meant to ensure safety within and around the Afghan capital of Kabul.

Other missions, yet smaller ones with regard to personnel, such as setting up and running a hospital in Cambodia, evacuation and transfer of wounded personnel from East Timor to Australia, disaster relief in various African states, or participation in the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMOG) are listed for the sake of completeness only.

2.2. PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF GERMAN FORCES DEPLOYED¹⁶

Approx. 1,700 German soldiers were deployed in the scope of the Somalia operation.

Approx. 700 German soldiers participated in UNPROFOR.

The German IFOR contingent consisted of approx. 2,700 soldiers.

Approx. 2,100 German soldiers were deployed in the immediately following SFOR operation in the beginning.¹⁷

Approx. 800 German soldiers participated in the operations KVM and Extraction Force.

The number of German soldiers participating in peace operations clearly increased with the KFOR mission. In the summer of 1999, a total of approx. 10,000 German soldiers were deployed in the scope of the various missions on the Balkans.

Initially, Germany acted as lead nation for the Task Force Fox deployed in Macedonia. In the beginning, the number of German forces amounted to approx. 450 soldiers.

By means of restructuring measures for all operations on the Balkans, the German contribution could be limited to a total of approx. 6,000 soldiers by the end of 2002.¹⁸

The Bundeswehr participates with a total of approx. 1,000 soldiers in operation ENDURING FREEDOM.¹⁹ Approx. 1,250 soldiers are deployed in the scope of ISAF. The German contingent was increased to 2,500 soldiers, following the assumption of command of this force by the German-Netherlands Corps on February 10, 2003.²⁰

Altogether, nearly 8,500 Bundeswehr soldiers were deployed abroad by the end of 2002.

3. MISSION EFFECTS ON BUNDESWEHR PERSONNEL

3.1. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF MISSION PECULIARITIES

Soldiers deployed in the scope of military missions are subject to unusual strain. The fact of being separated from their families and friends for a long time, being on duty 24 hours a day / 7 days a week without noteworthy relaxation and spare time, being on duty in an environment often destroyed by war and characterized by poverty, being accommodated in camps in cramped space, being restricted in the freedom of movement because of curfews etc. which are necessary to protect the soldiers, while life at home is peaceful as a rule, are challenges to care and welfare, military pay and pensions as well as personnel management.

When the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) was prepared, it clearly showed that in some cases other qualifications are required during missions than during the peacetime structure of the armed forces.

Within the Bundeswehr, military specialists, e.g. for the armed forces postal system, are available as reservists only; they are not on active duty.

Full-time personnel for dining and recreation facilities are likewise not included in the active personnel structure.²¹

Personnel management was faced with new challenges in forming mission contingents not only with regard to individual qualifications. Certain branches and qualifications are required in every mission contingent – irrespective of the contingent size.

The political demand to ensure during missions the same medical support that is provided by a German county hospital leads to intense strain on medical officers and other medical specialists.

A similar situation exists with Army aviation: each German mission contingent has its own army aviation forces.

Other branches called on above average are the signal forces, electronic warfare forces, military police, drone batteries of the artillery, and NBC defense elements (water purification).

The high specialization level of the personnel of these branches makes recruitment more difficult, since personnel reserves with the required qualifications often are not available.²²

In contrast to ground forces, air forces can often be deployed outside the crisis area and operate from there.²³ By this type of deployment the employment of soldiers can be restricted to military core functions. Supporting tasks can often be performed by civilian manpower. Thus, the respective mission contingent can be kept much smaller than a comparable Army contingent.

3.2. MEASURES FOR REDUCING MISSION-RELATED STRAIN

Regarding missions conducted up to the middle of 1999--the beginning of the KFOR mission with a considerable augmentation of forces--political and military leaders focused their attention on the development of welfare and recreation programs for soldiers and on ensuring that employed soldiers received military pay and surviving dependents received military pensions.

Efforts concentrated on setting up and running messing and recreation facilities, establishing armed forces mail and voice traffic between the theater and home country, and on setting up Internet cafés in theater.²⁴ At home, family support centers were set up to serve as points of contact for dependents, maintain contact to the theater and advise and support dependents in all vital matters.

As regards military pay, above all the introduction of the overseas allowance needs to be mentioned. Every member of the contingent receives this benefit, irrespective of his rank. The amount is graded, taking into consideration the respective strains and aggravating circumstances. The following table shows the available grades:

Grade 1	25.56 €
Grade 2	40.90 €
Grade 3	53.69 €
Grade 4	66.47 €
Grade 5	79.25 €
Grade 6	92.03 €

TABLE 1. PER DIEM RATES OF OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES BY GRADES

The following per diem rates for overseas allowances apply currently in the different mission areas:²⁵

Mission Area ²⁶	Mission ²⁷	Overseas allowance grades ²⁵	Number of Soldiers ²⁶
Bosnia-Herzegovina	SFOR	4	1,500
Kosovo	KFOR	5	4,300
Macedonia	TFF	5	270
Horn of Africa, Djibouti, Kuwait	EF	3	860

Afghanistan	ISAF	6	1,050
Uzbekistan	ISAF	3	200

TABLE 2. PER DIEM RATES OF OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES IN MISSION AREAS (JANUARY 2003)

Regarding military pensions, the non-recurrent payment and an increased military pension after mission-related personal injuries/deaths top the list of measures taken.²⁸

From the point of view of personnel management, the time on station and the time between missions are the decisive variables. In 1995 the basic time on station for Army contingents was determined to be four months.²⁹ Leave was not granted during this time.

When planning the IFOR contingent, it was expected that the mission would be limited to one year. Therefore, numerous soldiers who had formed part of the first contingent were deployed again in the third contingent. Thus, supplementary training had become unnecessary, and experience gained during the first mission period could be used.

The basic contingent time of four months was initially kept for the immediately following SFOR operation, too. It rapidly showed, however, that falling back on soldiers from earlier contingents would be too much strain for them. Even when the limitation of the SFOR mission was dropped in 1998, the basic mission time of four months was kept.

Different times on station were determined for individual groups of persons strained by exceptionally frequent missions: Soldiers with high-demand, low density military occupational skills, who predictably would be deployed more frequently, were authorized to serve their individual mission time in several terms (mission splitting).

4. ARISING PROBLEMS – MAKING SENSITIVE TO PERSTEMPO

4.1. RECRUITMENT SITUATION³⁰

4.1.1. Attitude Towards Initial Enlistment

Although Bundeswehr missions conducted in the scope of peace operations are highly appreciated by the general public, recruitment has been stagnant for years. Especially in the field of Army NCOs, it has not been possible to satisfy the demand for more than 10 years.

Surely the missions and their effects on the private life of the individual soldier³¹ are only some of the reasons that keep young people from applying for voluntary service as a Bundeswehr soldier.³² The little willingness to be mobile can be taken into account by the Bundeswehr only up to a certain point when it comes to garrison and structure decisions.

In the scope of adopting the Army structure "A New Army for New Tasks" as of 1996, available slots for enlisted personnel – this is always the level for entering the Bundeswehr voluntary service – were disproportionately shifted to crisis reaction units. For the most part, units of the main defense forces had only as many slots for enlisted personnel as were needed for the regeneration of NCOs. This shifting of slots, which makes sense for structural reasons, was meant to enable crisis reaction units to provide mission contingents for peace operations and other mission tasks without external reinforcement. In fact, the establishment of volunteer units resulted in the fact that there were not enough volunteers to satisfy the recruitment needs on the local level or in smaller catchment areas. Besides, only very few conscripts in basic military service were found in these units, so that this source could not sufficiently be used for recruitment purposes either.³³ On the other hand, it was observed that some units of the main defense forces could not accept every applicant qualified for enlistment, as there were not enough slots available on the local level. A similar observation can be made with regard to winning conscripts voluntarily serving additional time.³⁴

Temporary-career volunteers (soldiers serving a four-year-period) or conscripts voluntarily serving additional time are hardly faced with the problem of recurring missions. Enlisted service, to include missions abroad, is highly attractive to these groups of persons. Compared to serving in a garrison, participation in a mission abroad is more varied and interesting and gives the opportunity to gain experiences that young people in the age group of 20 to 25 years normally cannot yet gain in other professions. The early assumption of responsibilities in a crisis area has a personality-forming effect that goes well beyond the mission. Certainly participation in a mission abroad partly is also an adventure, a "kick" that cannot be experienced by everybody. Last but not least, participation in a mission abroad is also financially attractive because of the overseas allowance.

4.1.2. Attitude Towards Reenlistment

The attitude towards reenlistment reflects professional satisfaction better than the attitude towards initial enlistment. A high willingness to reenlist indicates that what the soldier has found in the Bundeswehr meets or even exceeds his expectations. On the other hand, a small willingness to reenlist shows that at least some elements of this temporary-career profession do not meet the expectations. Interviews with soldiers indicate that even the expectation of participating often or frequently in missions abroad has a negative effect on the attitude towards reenlistment. The perception of the effects of constantly recurring missions abroad is opposite to

that of initial enlistment. There is a decrease in the willingness to voluntarily serve a longer time as a Bundeswehr soldier.

This experience corresponds to experiences made by the US armed forces.³⁵

4.1.3. Acceptance Into Service as a Career Service Member

Since the Bundeswehr came into existence, it has always and in all careers had clearly more applicants for acceptance into service as a career service member than it had acceptance capacities. This situation has changed in the past few years. The number of applicants is on the decrease – both in absolute figures and in relation to the years with high birthrates.³⁶ Although there is still more applicants than acceptance capacities, the surplus of applicants is smaller than in previous years.

4.2. CONTINGENT MANNING

As a rule, contingent manning within the Army is decentralized. Long before the mission, a division is determined as lead division for each contingent.³⁷ The lead division determines which units act as lead unit for the mission units. On principle, the unit is responsible for recruiting and training soldiers who are to participate in the mission.

By determining the lead units at an early stage, these units have the chance of selective recruitment for the mission. In addition, they are granted priority in the scope of centralized recruitment.³⁸

In case individual mission posts cannot be manned from the personnel available within a lead unit, the higher command will make endeavors to recruit the required personnel from other units not directly earmarked for the mission. This process is continued throughout all levels of command and may in individual cases result in posts being manned with soldiers from other services or organizational areas.

By means of decentralized manning mission contingents, the mission units man posts with the same personnel that is employed in the peacetime structure, as far as this is possible. Experience has shown that making use of grown social ties is of advantage to the mission. This applies above all to group cohesion on the squad and platoon level.

Although personnel are provided decentralized as a rule, a unit can only seldom provide all the personnel needed for the mission from within its own ranks. Mission organizations that differ from the unit's peacetime organization, course-related absences, unmanned posts, lacking health requirements, lacking knowledge of foreign languages and other reasons again and again result in having to fall back on other unit for providing the personnel needed.

4.3. THE VOICE OF THE FAMILY

The choice of profession – to include the decision whether a once chosen profession should be kept for a longer time – is also influenced by the individuals persons relate to most closely. Therefore, it is of importance to the armed forces to know the influence closely affiliated persons have on the applicant and/or soldier.

It is obvious and does not require a separate analysis that mission-related longer periods of separation as a rule do not meet with much approval of the wife/husband or girlfriend/boyfriend. It is often said that the missions result in impairing the quality of life. Soldiers deployed in mission cannot take part in important family events, such as the birth of a child, the birthdays of wives/husbands and children, the first Communion, the completion of important phases at school and in vocational training etc., which is felt to be a strain especially within families with small children.³⁹ In addition, the partner left at home is solely responsible for raising the children and coping with problems of everyday life. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the partner will try to influence the soldier to the effect that he resigns from the armed forces and looks for another job which entails lesser periods of separation and less strain for the relationship and possibly for the family.⁴⁰

The situation can be aggravated even more if the partner is working. Especially when small children or school children need to be taken care of, it will hardly be possible that the wife/husband who stayed home can still pursue her/his job. Leave without pay or even dismissals in the worst case cannot be ruled out as potential consequences.

A study conducted within the officer corps of the US Army in the year 2000 shows that nowadays clearly more younger officers resign from the Army than was the case in the times of the Cold War (increase by 58 percent). Aside from a general dissatisfaction with their roles in the scope of peace operations, the fact of being separated from the family and the wife's job play an important role.⁴¹

Summing up, it is safe to assume that the influence of persons closely affiliated with the soldier will have a negative effect on his willingness to pursue his profession for a longer period.

4.4. THE TERM: PERSTEMPO

The term PERSTEMPO – personnel tempo – is closely connected with related terms: OPTEMPO, WORKTEMPO and DEPTEMPO.⁴²

The US Armed Forces first adopted the term OPTEMPO – operations tempo – as an instrument for measuring the strain on forces during operations. OPTEMPO measures

equipment usage – aircraft “flying hours”, ship “steaming days” or tank ”(driving) miles“ serve as units of measurement – and thus indirectly the strain on personnel, too.

WORKTEMPO – work tempo – defines the workload soldiers have at their home stations. In connection with deployments it can be said that those soldiers staying at home while their unit is deploying experience an increased WORKTEMPO. Often they have to perform the same jobs with far fewer personnel. A unit preparing for deployment regularly has an increased WORKTEMPO prior to departure.

DEPTEMPO – deployment tempo – measures the numbers of days in a month that a unit is away from its home station for training or mission purposes.

In the course of the past few years, the term PERSTEMPO has become more precise in meaning. Initially it was used practically interchangeably with the term OPTEMPO.⁴³ The term OPTEMPO, however, says only little about how much of the individual soldier’s time is taken up by operational missions. At first the US Navy favored the method of measuring the mission times of units.⁴⁴ This method is not suitable either for assessing the strain under which the individual soldier is, since the reassignment of individual soldiers to other units or non-participation in a mission is not included.

The high operational strain encountered during the missions on the Balkans finally brought this subject before the U.S. Congress.⁴⁵ By means of the National Defense Authorization Act 2000 (NDAA 2000) and supplements and/or amendments in NDAA 2001 and NDAA 2002, the U.S. Congress defined the term PERSTEMPO as “the amount of time members of the armed forces are engaged in their official duties, including official duties at a location or under circumstances that make it infeasible for a member to spend off-duty time in the housing in which the member resides when on garrison duty at the member’s permanent duty station.”⁴⁶

By means of this definition, the U.S. Congress determined that things must be viewed on an individual basis. Furthermore, the definition comprises not only mission times, but also practice and training times, provided they prevent spending spare time at one’s home station.

Other than in the U.S. definition, only mission times – disregarding mission preparation and follow-up activities – are used as a basis when treating the subject within the German Army. Furthermore, practice and training times not connected with the mission are completely disregarded.⁴⁷

On the whole, the definition laid down in NDAA 2001 seems to be better suited for understanding the problem, as it all-encompassing emphasizes the separation from one’s family and friends. Mission-related times of absence, such as mission preparation and follow-up

activities, and the mission itself are considered creditable times in the intendment of the law.⁴⁸ The same applies to times of absence for practice and training purposes. Excluded are only annual leave, disciplinary measures, absent without leave, desertion and hospitalization.⁴⁹

For this reason, the term PERSTEMPO is defined as follows for the study: PERSTEMPO shows the amount of time a soldiers spends off-post due to official duties--training, exercises, missions--which makes it infeasible to spend off-duty time at home. The recording of times is done on an individual basis. Times of absence caused by annual leave, disciplinary measures, absence without leave, desertion or hospitalization are not taken into consideration.

5. ROAD TO AN “EQUITABLE PERSTEMPO”

With operational requirements on the one hand and the demands of soldiers and their families on the other hand to keep mission-related periods of separation as short as possible, political and military leaders will have to face the challenge of establishing a PERSTEMPO which is as just as possible and can be accepted by the concerned parties.

5.1. CONSTRUCTION OF MODELS

The most extreme approach to establishing an acceptable PERSTEMPO would be to reduce it to zero. However, this solution can be realized only if no duties whatsoever are performed off-post. This would not only rule out participation in peace operations or other missions, but would also include to completely renounce off-post training and exercises. This solution must be ruled out, however, without going into the details of the infeasibility of such an approach.

In view of the Bundeswehr obligation to take care of its soldiers and considering the image of man derived from the principles of leadership and civic education, disregard of the consequences resulting from a high PERSTEMPO must likewise be ruled out as an approach.

When looking for approaches, it is therefore important to define the freedom of action which allows political and military leaders to create the prerequisites for an equitable and acceptable PERSTEMPO by means of active structuring.

5.1.1. Provision of Sufficient Forces Needed

At first glance, an obvious approach seems to be to augment the number of forces needed for missions, which results in less operational strain on the individual soldier.

The requirements for the type of forces needed – branch, equipping mission units with certain weapon systems, the number of forces needed for a certain mission, knowledge of foreign languages, special military training, special non-military training, and required valid

licenses – vary from mission to mission. As a rule, the full details on how the mission force is to be structured with regard to quantity and quality will be known only shortly prior to the beginning of the mission. This short-term notification of mission requirements aggravates long-term force planning which would be required to bring the armed forces structure in line with specific operational requirements.

Previous mission experiences show, however, that certain branches or qualifications are always needed, irrespective of the concrete mission.⁵⁰ Force planning can provide for these frequently called on forces by means of requirements-oriented multipliers.⁵¹

When taking a detailed look at units, it can again and again be observed that not all positions are manned, or that the incumbent of a nominally manned position is not available for a mission.

As a rule, positions are unmanned because an insufficient number of volunteers has been recruited. This shortcoming can be countered both structurally and through the instrument of recruitment. As concerns the infrastructure, it is important that units are deployed in many places, so as to be able to offer the largest possible number of applicants a job in an acceptable distance to their place of residence. If the same number of units is deployed in fewer large garrisons, the distance between workplace and residence will increase for the average applicant, which will decrease his willingness to voluntarily serve in the armed forces. Another structural approach consists of planning more positions in the basic structure of units (TOE) than will experience-wise be needed for the mission. This results in creating a personnel reserve which can be used to compensate for vacancies – unmanned positions or personnel not available for the mission. Although the thought of keeping available more personnel than is needed to perform the unit's tasks is uneconomical under personnel management aspects, this possibility should not altogether be rejected against the background of the personnel composition of mission contingents. Recruitment agencies should have instruments that can be used flexibly, so as to be able to react adequately to the requirements of the market of potential applicants. Up to now, incentives – e.g. enlistment bonuses or guarantees to pay for vocational training – have been available to all applicants to the same extent, without being able to take into consideration e.g. regional or local pay levels or the special requirements of a unit. This weakens the competitiveness of the "employer" Armed Forces on the manpower market.

There can be different reasons for existing personnel not being available for missions. Soldiers not fit for missions abroad due to temporary or permanent aptitude limitations are not available for missions. The same applies to female soldiers who fall under the law for the protection of expectant or nursing mothers (Maternity Protection Act), or to soldiers undergoing

training. Reassigning these soldiers to other units not involved in missions often fails for legal⁵² or personal reasons.⁵³ A different situation exists with soldiers undergoing training. In the past, career training and assignment qualification courses for Army junior and senior NCO candidates were conducted by using position slots. This results in the situation that a position is technically manned with a soldier who, however, is not available to the unit since he is attending a training course. By using the instrument of positions for special duties (student budget), training can be conducted without causing vacancies within the unit through course-related periods of absence.⁵⁴ Last but not least, mission units should get priority in satisfying their personnel requirements – not only during recruitment, but also when it comes to manning all positions.

Although the provision of a sufficient number of required forces cannot be predicted with absolute certainty, it is a certain instrument with regard to structure and personnel management that helps to improve the situation of mission units.

5.1.2. Reducing the Number of Soldiers Needed

An effective instrument for guaranteeing an equitable and acceptable PERSTEMPO is to reduce the number of soldiers needed for the mission.

Soldiers will always be needed for the core functions of peace operations. Yet, certain tasks, especially in the field of mission support, can be performed by man-saving technology and thus contribute to reducing manpower requirements.

Example: Wireless communications technologies and automatic-dial telephone systems - both in local and long-distance communications – allow a considerable reduction in signals personnel needed. Once communications facilities are established, signal personnel are needed only for the operation and maintenance of facilities. However, in these fields modern digital technology likewise results in a reduction in manpower requirements: The user can operate many devices on his own; technical staff is no longer required. In addition, the devices need to be serviced less often and with less resources, which results in further decreasing the need for maintenance personnel.

For this reason, it must always be reviewed if the tasks of support personnel can also be assumed by technology.

In other fields – e.g. in kitchens and repair shops which do not need highly qualified personnel – local nationals can be hired to perform these tasks.

Periodic reviews of the manpower still needed for mission accomplishment, which must be conducted at all levels of command, are another instrument suitable for reducing the manpower requirement.

5.1.3. Planning Possibilities and Predictability

Like all peace operations, military operations cannot be preplanned on a long-term basis. The decision to conduct these operations is often made on a short-term basis and is not up to military leaders.⁵⁵

Yet, certain planning precautions can be taken. Units which are to be available for missions on principle will be identified and named. It can also make sense to determine units which are to be deployed on a short warning time as some kind of fire brigade. This determination should be made not only on a case-to-case basis, but in a long-term rhythm, so that all concerned soldiers and their dependents can adjust their private plans at an early stage.

Once plans have been made, they should be adhered to. Changes to plans have the same effect on the individuals concerned than no plans. The reliability of long-term planning is an indispensable basis for retaining confidence into command authorities and for gaining acceptance for decisions made.

The same applies to ongoing peace operations: planning periods of 3 to 5 years should be striven for. The early announcement of plans to the concerned soldiers and their families is mandatory for the individual plans. The same principles apply to individual soldiers who are needed for missions irrespective of their parent unit, e.g. because of their individual special qualifications.

Especially with regard to tasks that require special and scarce qualifications, the concerned soldiers should be included in the planning process. As concerns high-demand, low density military occupational skills, solutions deviating from the usual principles should be made possible.

The Bundeswehr uses the personnel management instrument of temporary duty to deploy soldiers in peace operations. This means that the soldier keeps a position in his parent unit and will return to it after the end of the mission. It seems worth considering to review if the instrument of a permanent change of station might be a possibility for individual positions.

Experience made in the SFOR and KFOR missions which have been going on for years show that the change of personnel every six months is detrimental to the continuous cooperation between SFOR and/or KFOR forces and representatives of all political levels. Confidence in the mission force is often based on personal contacts between individual soldiers and individual representatives of the entities and can thus not simply be transferred to the follow-up contingent. A better continuity in key functions might be achieved through a permanent change of station – which could possibly be limited to, e.g. two years.⁵⁶

The key to acceptance lies in planning possibilities and the reliability of plans. A high PERSTEMPO is more likely to be accepted by the concerned soldiers and their families if the absence has been known for a longer time, and if personal and family plans can be adjusted accordingly.

5.1.4. Framework Conditions

Although framework conditions do not have a direct effect on the PERSTEMPO, it is safe to assume that they can influence its acceptance indirectly.

Care and welfare measures in theater, such as the availability of Internet, telephone and mail connections to the home country, make life easier both for the soldier participating in a mission and for his family. Other measures, such as TV programs, sports facilities, libraries and similar facilities have an effect only on the soldier himself.

Family support centers and family support points are extremely effective.⁵⁷ They not only serve as points of contact for dependents, but also advise and support dependents in all vital matters.

The possibility of being able to interrupt the mission period by means of taking annual leave is another important criterion for tailoring the mission.

Special military pensions in case of mission-related personal injuries/deaths are an indispensable element of the framework conditions of missions in order to gain acceptance.

5.1.5. Incentives

Beginning with the UNOSOM II mission, the creation of special incentives, especially financial ones, for participation in missions abroad had been of major importance within the Bundeswehr. By means of the overseas allowance, which in contrast to military pay for participation in missions abroad is not dependent on the soldier's rank or pay grade but only on the strains and aggravating circumstances in a defined theater, an incentive was created which corresponds to the image of man of civic education and leadership.

Other possibilities for incentives are the multiple crediting of mission times for the amount of a pension or for an early retirement⁵⁸ as well as tax exemption for pay accrued during the mission.⁵⁹

The Bundeswehr conducted studies to the effect of taking into consideration the participation in missions, in particular with regard to promotions. However, this approach was not pursued further since all soldiers who could not be called on for participation in missions would thus have been prejudiced.⁶⁰ This would have been a violation of the principle of equal treatment embodied in the Military Service Act.

5.1.6. Relation Between Mission Time and Non-Mission Time

With progressing missions on the Balkans, not only PERSTEMPO was a subject of discussion. The relation between mission times and non-mission times also became a focus of interest.

Although there is no general formula for an equitable or at least acceptable relation between mission time and non-mission time, certain contexts can be derived. The relation can be expressed in percent. For instance, 20 percent mean that the mission time during a 100 percent period amounts to one-fifth of the overall period, while four-fifths are non-mission time. Expressing the relation by means of the ratio is just as common. As concerns the above example, the ration is 1 : 4.

As long as only the pure mission time – without mission-preparatory training and other influencing factors – is taken into consideration, the overall mission time in a given period - the PERSTEMPO - will always stay the same, irrespective of the contingent time on station (Figures 1 and 2).




FIGURE 1. FOUR MONTHS DEPLOYMENT (WITHOUT TRAINING)




FIGURE 2. SIX MONTHS DEPLOYMENT (WITHOUT TRAINING)

It is not only the mission time, however, that is of importance with regard to the actual PERSTEMPO. Other times – e.g. for training and exercises – must also be taken into consideration.

Generally, it can be said that shorter mission times result in shorter non-mission times, provided the relation between mission times and non-mission times remains unchanged. Taking also into consideration that each mission is intensively prepared by means of specialized training, that this training that takes place during the non-mission time and is largely conducted off-post, the PERSTEMPO increases with shorter mission times.⁶¹ The examples of figures 3 and 4 clearly show that the shorter contingent time on station of four months altogether results in a higher PERSTEMPO than the longer contingent time on station of six months.




FIGURE 3. FOUR MONTHS DEPLOYMENT (WITH TRAINING)




FIGURE 4. SIX MONTHS DEPLOYMENT (WITH TRAINING)

At the same time, the increasingly required training of mission contingents adds to the strain on the personnel conducting this training, and results in higher costs.

5.2. GERMAN ARMY MODEL

Until 1999, the time on station for German Army mission contingents was determined to be four months. As a rule, annual leave was not granted during this period. Only on special occasions, a few days of emergency leave were permissible.⁶² Special regulations for non-mission times did not exist.

When it showed in the preparatory stage for the KFOR mission that the Army would need a total of up to 10,000 deployed soldiers for the missions on the Balkans, the Chief of Staff, Army, ordered a study on how recruitment for the contingents can be better structured.⁶³ His constraint was that a period of at least two years between two missions must be ensured. In numerous conversations with soldiers and with family members, this period had again and again been mentioned to him as being acceptable.

5.2.1. Study Results

In a first step, the existing contingent time on station of four months without annual leave was taken as a basis. As figure 5 shows, seven identically structured contingents would have been needed for this, provided a non-mission period of two years between two missions was ensured.




FIGURE 5. FOUR MONTHS DEPLOYMENT, TWO YEARS WITHOUT DEPLOYMENT

An analysis of units down to platoon-size available for missions showed that the required force posture with the multiplier of seven existed only in a few branches and/or qualifications within the army structure. A multiplier of five, however, could be realized in most branches. The analysis of the force posture also showed in great detail the need for follow-up personnel. By means of replacing approx. 13,000 conscripts in basic military service with volunteers in the fields of command and control, reconnaissance, logistics, medical service and the corps of

engineers, it was possible to provide the required force posture through planning. The Army was able to clearly improve its long-term mission sustainability.

Under the target set by the Chief of Staff to structurally enable a non-mission period of two years and the outcome of the first step of the study that a force multiplier of five was for the most part feasible, the further study resulted in the outcome that the mission time on station must be increased from four to six months (figure 6).




FIGURE 6. SIX MONTHS DEPLOYMENT, TWO YEARS WITHOUT DEPLOYMENT

A comparison with the mission contingents of other nations deployed to the Balkans showed that the vast majority of nations was already practicing a mission time on station of six months.

In order to increase the acceptance for extending the mission period from four to six months, the possibility was granted to interrupt the mission period by taking two weeks of annual leave.

5.2.2. Measures

In order to make plans predictable for both units and soldiers, the Army Forces Command set up five equally structured contingents oriented to the basic structure of the German Army contingents SFOR and KFOR during the summer of 1999.

The Chief of Staff, Army, urged superiors at all levels of command to inform intensively the forces on the new plans, and to actively explain decisions made to soldiers and to their wives/husbands and other family members.⁶⁴

Since December of 1999, the five-contingent-system has been in use within the German Army.

5.2.3. Structural Consequences

When the then Federal Minister of Defense, Rudolf Scharping, initiated a new force planning by means of the so-called "Cornerstones Paper" on 01 June 2000, the Chief of Staff, Army, seized the opportunity for orienting the Army structure stronger than before to operational requirements.⁶⁵

The five mechanized divisions, which command at least two active brigades each during peacetime, are the core of force structures.⁶⁶ In the newly created Army Support Forces Command, units that used to be directly assigned to each division as divisional units were Army-wide integrated in branch-specific brigades.⁶⁷ The multiplier five is found again in the interior structure of these units.

The Special Operations Division is a military force which, because of its high operational readiness and light equipment, is especially well suited for rapid deployment to a new mission area where it will conduct initial operations, while elements of the mechanized divisions are establishing full operational readiness. Operation ISAF has proven that this system works in practice, too.⁶⁸

Yet, planning precautions for long-lasting missions were taken not only in the rough structure. The previously existing weak points in the interior structure of units were largely eliminated. An important prerequisite for effective internal recruitment was created through the principle of "meshing" at battalion level.⁶⁹ In addition, a battalion commander who must provide two mission companies for a mission contingent gains more free play with regard to the personnel composition. As a rule, NCOs and officers as well as specialists from the companies that include conscripts can likewise be used for manning mission companies. Personal interests can more flexibly be taken into consideration because of the greater personnel strength.

Planning additional positions for mission-related tasks in the peacetime structure reduces the need for reinforcements during a mission.⁷⁰ As concerns the newly introduced careers of

NCO specialists and senior NCOs, these soldiers are being trained by using positions for special duties (student budget), which clearly increases the availability of these soldiers for missions.⁷¹ With regard to these careers, it is also intended to employ soldiers on the same position and/or in the same unit for longer periods, so as to be able to make better use of the experience gained in this position and to ensure more continuity for the soldiers' families, too.

All in all, the new Army structure, which is called "Army of the Future", clearly is much more mission-oriented than all previous structures.

5.3. EVALUATION

The criteria developed in paragraph 5.1. are used for evaluating the new Army structure.

5.3.1. Provision of Sufficient Forces Needed

With five nearly identically structured mechanized divisions and the multiplier five for combat support forces integrated in the Army Support Forces Command (Force multiplier), the German Army has structure-wise created an important prerequisite for providing forces to peace operations. It takes a more detailed analysis to determine to what extent this also applies to the Airmobile Forces Division and the Special Operations Division.⁷² In view of the most recent announcements Federal Minister of Defense Peter Struck made with regard to adjusting the Army structure to the experience made in ongoing operations, it seems that details of the structure "Army of the Future" need to be improved. Struck said, among other things: "...the sustainability of signal forces, engineers and NBC defense forces will be improved."⁷³ In this interview, Struck also announced that units will be dual-role capable: "...a maneuver battalion can be restructured to the effect that it becomes a signal, NBC or engineer battalion." This seems to be a promising approach in improving the availability of a sufficient number of soldiers.

Planning for additional positions in the basic structure of units and activities enhances personnel reserves and decreases the need for reinforcements from other units and activities during a mission.

Providing a sufficient number of positions for special duties (student budget) for soldiers undergoing training is a key prerequisite for units and activities in manning their positions with the available soldiers. Soldiers undergoing training can additionally relieve units and activities from peacetime routine duties in that they serve their practical training in mission units. In this case they are not directly available for missions, but they can perform the duties of soldiers participating in a mission at the soldiers' home stations. Thus, they contribute to reducing the WORKTEMPO of "those at home".⁷⁴

Yet, the improvement of structural fundamentals alone is only one prerequisite for providing sufficient operational forces. As long as these structures are not manned, personnel reinforcements from other units and activities will continue to be necessary.⁷⁵ The principle of meshing, however, allows to fall back on personnel from within the unit on the local level.

5.3.2. Reducing the Number of Soldiers Needed

Detailed findings on manpower-saving consequences cannot be directly derived from the structure.

Reviews of the force requirement for missions on the Balkans show that this instrument is consequently being applied by all nations.

5.3.3. Planning Possibilities and Predictability

By means of the five-contingent-system the German Army has a basis that enables long-term planning on all levels of command. In September 2001, the Chief of Staff, Army, allocated to the mechanized divisions their mission periods up to and including the year 2005.⁷⁶ Consequently, superiors at all levels of command must designate the units and agencies which will actually be called on for participation in a mission within a certain period.

An individual study would be required to determine to what extent such long-term planning will also be conducted for soldiers with high-demand, low density military occupational skills, irrespective of the unit to which they belong.

As a rule, the new Army structure also allows families to predict a potential mission period in the long term, so that private plans can be adjusted accordingly.

So far, the German Army has not made any plans for permanently transferring soldiers to theater.

5.3.4. Framework Conditions

It is difficult to assess care and welfare measures under scientific aspects. As a rule, potential recipients expect more than can be offered.⁷⁷ The author knows from own experience that the satisfaction of demands and expectations is taken for granted.⁷⁸ The question "What is sufficient?" cannot be definitely answered under scientific aspects.⁷⁹

Manning family support centers with full-time support personnel certainly is a progress leading to improved and more professional family support.⁸⁰

Certainly possibilities of interrupting the mission period by taking annual leave or personal leave are not yet exhausted. Soldiers and their families consider the long period of separation caused by participation in missions as being considerable strain.⁸¹ The recommended cutting

down of the mission period to a maximum of three to four months⁸² must be seen in close connection to the period of stay at home between two missions, and for this reason can probably not be realized.⁸³

Just like care and welfare measures, pensions paid for mission-related personal injuries/deaths are a subject field that cannot be assessed under scientific aspects with regard to the question "What is sufficient?". Recent reports show that it is intended to further improve pensions for soldiers participating in missions.⁸⁴

5.3.5. Incentives

Although the overseas allowance paid by the Bundeswehr is an attractive financial incentive for participation in missions abroad, this incentive was not even mentioned in a recently conducted empirical study.⁸⁵

Even though the participation in missions can for legal reasons not be taken into consideration when it comes to deciding about promotions, it would be worth considering to give soldiers who participated in missions a certain priority when it comes to deciding on assignments, e.g. with regard to the location.

5.3.6. Relation Between Mission Time and Non-Mission Time

As it has already been explained in paragraph 5.1.6., it is not only the pure mission time in relation to the time between two missions that is of importance for the study on PERSTEMPO. Other duty-related periods of absence likewise need to be taken into consideration. The Army basic structure, that builds on the force multiplier five in order to attain an equitable and acceptable PERSTEMPO, is an important prerequisite. In practice, however, acceptance will to a large extent be influenced by soldier-oriented personnel decisions on participation in a mission.

In view of the lack of German Army NCOs serving a longer period, winning a sufficient number of qualified applicants for the careers of junior and senior NCOs is likewise a major challenge. Unmanned positions not only make routine duties at the home station more difficult and increase the WORKTEMPO, but they also reduce internal recruitment possibilities for contingent manning.

6. CONCLUSIONS

By means of the structural embodiment of its five-contingent-system, which ensures a non-mission period of two years between two missions on principle, the German Army has created good prerequisites for an equitable and acceptable PERSTEMPO. The principle of

meshing results in having mission units at every garrison as a rule. When setting up contingents, one can therefore initially fall back on locally available personnel, provided they have the required qualifications.

Following the adoption of the new structure, the largest challenge to the German Army will consist of recruiting the amount of volunteers needed.⁸⁶

Last but not least, the confidence of soldiers and their families into political and military leaders will depend on whether the leaders can convey their decisions and measures in a credible manner.

Word count = 8,337

ENDNOTES

- ¹ For example the collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of former independent states or the breakdown of Yugoslavia – a conglomerate of historically independent states, held together only by the communist leadership under President Tito.
- ² For example the separation of Czech and Slovakia.
- ³ For example the breakdown of Yugoslavia.
- ⁴ During the Cold War, German armed forces were engaged abroad only for disaster relief operations.
- ⁵ In this study only the masculine term for soldier is used. However, female soldiers are always included without mentioning them.
- ⁶ NATO Operation Joint Endeavor, 20 December 1995 – 20 December 1996
- ⁷ Including mine clearance.
- ⁸ NATO Operation Joint Guard, 21 December 1996 – 19 June 1998
- ⁹ Half infantry with the APC FUCHS, half armored cavalry with the armored reconnaissance vehicle LUCHS
- ¹⁰ NATO Operation Joint Forge, starting 19 June 1998
- ¹¹ This operation started in November 1998.
- ¹² For legal reasons the observers had to be civilians. So the soldiers volunteering to be observers were temporarily relieved from the military duties and sent as civilians.
- ¹³ The international Extraction Force stationed in Kumanovo, Macedonia, had the mission to extract the OSCE observers from the Kosovo – if required, by force.
- ¹⁴ These forces redeployed to Germany after the construction of the refugee camps and the handover of the camps to civilian relief organizations.
- ¹⁵ In early 2003, this force was downsized and renamed to Allied Harmony ("bw-global, Beispiele voruebergehender Praesenz der Bundeswehr im Ausland, Februar 2003", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, 2/2003, S. 121 ("bw-global, Examples of temporary presence abroad of the Bundeswehr, February 2003", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, February 2003, 121))
- ¹⁶ If not mentioned otherwise, the data were provided by the German Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff I 1.
- ¹⁷ This figure includes the German soldiers in multinational headquarters.
- ¹⁸ SFOR: approx. 1,500; KFOR: approx. 4.300; TFF: approx. 270; ("bw-global, Beispiele voruebergehender Praesenz der Bundeswehr im Ausland, Dezember 2002", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, 12/2002, S. 121 ("bw-global, Examples of temporary presence abroad of the Bundeswehr, December 2002", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, December 2002, 121))

Bundeswehr, 12/2002, S. 118 (“bw-global, Examples of temporary presence abroad of the Bundeswehr, December 2002”, Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, December 2002, 118))

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ available from
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/einsatz_aktuell/isaf/ueberblick/reportagen/1jahr_isaf.php
Internet; accessed 22 March 2003

²¹ Applies to the Army structure until 2002. The changes as from 2002 are mentioned in section 5.2.3.

²² Often personnel reserves cannot be set up, because the licenses for qualification will expire unless certain activities have been carried out within a defined period of time.

²³ The German Operational Wing 1 which was employed in the framework of SFOR as well as in NATO Air Campaign ALLIED FORCE, was stationed in Piacenza, Italy.

²⁴ For example restaurants, canteens, sports facilities, movie theaters, libraries.

²⁵ Areas with minor contingents (less than 100) are not taken into account.

²⁶ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Uebersicht ueber die Auslandsverwendungszuschlaege in den SFOR-/KFOR-/AH/ISAF/EF/UNOMIG-Einsatzgebieten, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – PSZ III 2 – Az 19-02-16 (Bonn, 02. Januar 2003) (German Federal Ministry of Defense, Survey over the Overseas Allowances in the SFOR-/KFOR-/AH/ISAF/EF/UNOMIG-Mission areas, German Federal Ministry of Defense – PSZ III 2 – Az 19-02-16 (Bonn, 2 January 2003))

²⁷ “bw-global, Beispiele voruebergehender Praesenz der Bundeswehr im Ausland, Dezember 2002”, Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, 12/2002, S. 118 (“bw-global, Examples of temporary presence abroad of the Bundeswehr, December 2002”, Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, December 2002, 118)

²⁸ For details see the German Soldatenversorgungsgesetz (Military Pension Act).

²⁹ The German Air Force contingent in Piacenza, Italy had a mission period of four to eight weeks. Soldiers in international headquarters were employed there for six months.

³⁰ Colonel Anton Uthemann, Chief of branch, German Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff I 2, interview by author, 12 December 2002, Bonn

³¹ See section 3.1.

³² The discussion about closing down garrisons which has been going on for years or the various restructuring efforts since the end of the Cold War possibly deter potential candidates more than those missions.

³³ Traditionally the German army recruits about one half of their volunteers from conscripts in basic military service.

³⁴ The voluntary additional military service (FWD) was introduced in 1996. Legally, the soldier is still a conscript on the basis of the Compulsory Military Service Act. The FWD follows the basic military service and can be extended to an overall period of 23 months. The soldiers receive the same pay and contributions in kind as a conscript, but for the months following the basic military service an additional tax-free pay of approx. 700 €

³⁵ RAND research brief RB 7532, 'Perstempo – Does it Help or Hinder Reenlistment?', 1999, 3-5; available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB7532>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2003

³⁶ Stammdienststelle des Heeres, Jahresbericht 2001, Koeln, Januar 2002 (Army Enlisted Personnel Office, Annual Report 2001, Cologne January 2002)

³⁷ The Army Forces Command will make special regulations for branches not included in a division such as army aviation, medical personnel for hospitals.

³⁸ Recruitment in the army can be carried out centrally through the Recruiting Centers, but also decentralized by the units concerned.

³⁹ E. Casey Wardynski, Military Compensation in the Age of Two-Income Households – Adding Spouses' Earnings to the Compensation Policy Mix, Dissertation, RAND Graduate School, 2000, 147

⁴⁰ Ibid., 146

⁴¹ Thomas E. Ricks, "Younger Officers Quit Army at Fast Clip", Washington Post, 17 April 2000, A1

⁴² Jim Garamone, "Optempo, Perstempo: What They Mean", in: American Forces Press Service, 18 August 1999, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1999/n08181999_9908181.htm; Internet; accessed 15 January 2003

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Department of the Navy – Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, PERSONNEL TEMPO OF OPERATIONS, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3000.13B (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, 11 February 2000) 5.a

⁴⁵ Joseph H. Garvey, PERSTEMPO: Its Potentially Negative Effects on Retention and Readiness in the U.S. Army, Army Management Staff College, Class 01-01; available from <http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil/Articles/01-2/garvey.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2003; 3

⁴⁶ NDAA 2001, Sec. 487; available from <http://www.persom.army.mil/perstempo/law/law2001.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2003

⁴⁷ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Der Inspekteur des Heeres, Kommandeurbrief 1/1999, Bonn, 7. Juli 1999 (German Federal Ministry of Defense – Chief of Staff, Army : Letter to Commanders 1/1999, Bonn, 7 July 1999)

⁴⁸ PERSTEMPO Creditable Events; available from <https://www.perscom.army.mil/perstempo/brules/AnnexA42.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2003

⁴⁹ PERSTEMPO Non-Creditable Events; available from <https://www.perscom.army.mil/perstempo/brules/AnnexA42.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2003

⁵⁰ See Section 3.1.

⁵¹ See Section 5.1.6.

⁵² A soldier under maternity protection must not be transferred.

⁵³ A soldier who is no longer capable of foreign assignments and cannot carry out specific assignments due to an injury suffered on a mission abroad is normally not transferred against his wishes. If an assignment without mission duties cannot be found in his home station he will for a certain period of time continue to man his post in the mission unit.

⁵⁴ A post within the student budget is related to the individual and not to the post. Under the aspect of organization, the use of a billet exclusively for training purposes makes it impossible to plan that post in the force posture.

⁵⁵ Example: IFOR: After the conclusion of the Dayton agreement for the pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina on November 30, 1995 the IFOR mission started on December 20, 1995.

⁵⁶ Despite the advantages of a long-term transfer for the conduct of the mission, the risks must not be overlooked. Due to the special burdens of living in the mission areas the family will normally not move there. So the personnel must be selected only on the basis of voluntariness. Otherwise we will achieve just the opposite: the brusque rejection of the mission by the soldier and his family.

⁵⁷ Jan Techau, "Familie im Blickpunkt", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, 6/2002, S. 60f (Jan Techau, "Family in the Focus", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, June 2002, 60f)

⁵⁸ As practiced by the French Armed Forces.

⁵⁹ In the Bundeswehr e.g. the overseas allowance is tax-free while the normal pay is subject to the German taxes.

⁶⁰ E.g. military attaché personnel

⁶¹ Under the assumption that the training scope will remain unchanged irrespective of the mission period of the contingent.

⁶² E.g. in case of deaths, births

⁶³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Der Inspekteur des Heeres, Kommandeurbrief 1/1999, Bonn, 7. Juli 1999 (German Federal Ministry of Defense – Chief of Staff, Army; Letter to Commanders 1/1999, Bonn, 7 July 1999) This Letter to Commanders already includes the results of the study but also the criteria on which the study was based. The study was carried out in spring 1999.

⁶⁴ Ibid; last paragraph

⁶⁵ Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Die Bundeswehr – sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert; Eckpfeiler fuer eine Erneuerung von Grund auf, Bonn, 1. Juni 2000 (The Federal Minister of Defence, The Bundeswehr – Advancing Steadily into the 21st Century; Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal, Bonn, 1 June 2000)

⁶⁶ Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung: Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr – Grobausplanung – Ergebnisse und Entscheidungen, Oktober 2000 (The Federal Minister of Defence, Transformation of the Bundeswehr – Rough Planning – Results and Decisions, October 2000)

⁶⁷ One artillery brigade, antiaircraft brigade, engineer brigade, NBC defense brigade each and, two logistic brigades.

⁶⁸ The German Army started the ISAF operation initially with two subsequent contingents with Airborne Brigades 31 und 26 – both belong to the Special Operations Division. In the meantime those forces have been replaced by other units.

⁶⁹ “Meshing” means that a battalion has companies with volunteers only – additional service volunteers and temporary-career soldiers – as well as companies with conscripts. That collocation considerably facilitates recruiting of volunteers from the conscript units. See also Section 4.1.1.

⁷⁰ Examples: Welfare and personnel senior NCOs in the companies, additional officers in the battalion headquarters, and a significant personnel augmentation in the brigade and division headquarters.

⁷¹ See also Section 5.1.1.

⁷² Due to the lack of unclassified data this analysis cannot be carried out for the study.

⁷³ Peter Struck, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, “Vorstellung der Planungsweisung ‘Umsetzung von Entscheidungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Reform der Bundeswehr’”, Interview, 21. Februar 2003 (Peter Struck, German Defense Minister, “Presentation of the Planning Directive ‘Implementation of Decisions to Further Development of the Transformation of the Bundeswehr’”, Interview, 21 February 2002; available from http://www.bmvg.de/archiv/reden/minister/030221_int_planungsweisung.php; Internet; accessed 22 February 2003

⁷⁴ See Section 4.4.

⁷⁵ See Section 4.1.

⁷⁶ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Inspekteur des Heeres, Kommandeurbrief 1/2001, Bonn, 18. September 2001, Anlage 1 (German Federal Ministry of Defense – Chief of Staff Army; Letter to Commanders 1/2001, Bonn, 18 September 2001, Annex 1)

⁷⁷ Rainer Marr, Timea Biro, and Karin Steiner, Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf des Soldaten – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer familienorientierten Personalpolitik in der Bundeswehr, Empirisches Forschungsprojekt, Abschlussbericht (Neubiberg, Januar 2003), S. 102 ff (Rainer Marr, Timea Biro, and Karin Steiner, Compatibility of Family and Profession of a Soldier – Chances and Limits of a Family-oriented Personnel Policy in the Bundeswehr, Empirical Research Project, Final Report, Neubiberg, January 2003), 102ff

⁷⁸ From June 1998 to June 2002 the author was the Chief of Branch, German Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff I 1 (a.o. also welfare and care).

⁷⁹ The deficiencies in the information policies concerning welfare and care as found by Marr et al. is a special problem area that must initially be considered independently of the contents of care and welfare.

⁸⁰ Techau, 61

⁸¹ Rainer Marr, Timea Biro, and Karin Steiner, 95ff

⁸² Ibid., p. 101

⁸³ For details see Section 5.1.6.

⁸⁴ Axel Vogel, "Am Tropf der Gesetze", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, Februar 2003, S. 64 ff (Axel Vogel, "On the drip of the Laws", Y-Magazin der Bundeswehr, February 2003, 64ff)

⁸⁵ Rainer Marr, Timea Biro, and Karin Steiner, 75ff

⁸⁶ The introduction of the structure "Army of the Future" is planned for the time from 2002 to 2005. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Inspekteur des Heeres, Kommandeurbrief 1/2001, Bonn, 18. September 2001, Anlage 1 (German Federal Ministry of Defense – Chief of Staff Army; Letter to Commanders 1/2001, Bonn, 18 September 2001, Annex 1)

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